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This paper provides a model incorporating strategic speculative behaviour into a 
framework of debt default and contagion. A basic model of contagion shows how 
economies which appear fundamentally sound, can fail to meet foreign obligations 
when there are inter-linkages with a defaulting country. Introducing speculators into 
the framework increases the incidence of debt default and contagion. However, when 
these speculators view the economy with a degree of uncertainty, the likelihood of 
default and contagion is even greater. Speculators’ perceptions over the state of the 
economy are therefore paramount when estimating the impact of a crisis on a region. 
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World events of the last decade have generated a large and growing literature 
focused on contagion and the transmission of crises from one country to another. 
Indeed, contagion has been identified in many of the emerging markets over the last 
decade (Glick and Rose, 1999). The general story is that a crisis in one country will 
ultimately lead to crises in other financial centres since they are not only inextricably 
linked via trade and finance channels but also by speculator perceptions. It has been 
shown that a crisis in one country can generate a change in sentiment among 
speculators regarding the neighbouring region hence other countries are also subject 
to attacks on their financial systems. 
However, the events of 2001-2002 in Latin America are not completely 
supportive of this theory. The debt-default in Argentina which hit during November 
2001 did not pose an immediate threat to its neighbours. Indeed, the EMBI spreads 
indicate no great increase following the crisis and the commentators at the time were 
quick to question why the Latin American contagion had not happened. It was 
attributed to the fact that investors were more “savvy” about the state of each 
country’s fundamentals. This contradicts the Calvo and Mendoza (2000) argument 
where a crisis in one country acts as a “wake up” call to investors who view all other 
regional countries as homogenous. Conversely, during the latter half of 2002, as 
Argentinian fortunes worsened, EMBI spreads grew for many of the Latin countries 
and a regional crisis ensued. 
   A model is therefore needed that incorporates each scenario; the first in which 
a currency crisis is restricted to one country and the second in which it spreads 
throughout an entire region. To achieve this goal, the paper combines two influential 
models. It uses the inter-market bank framework of Elsinger et al. (2002) to  6
demonstrate how economies which initially appear solvent may be driven to default as 
a consequence of contagion. However, also built into this is the notion of common 
knowledge (from Morris and Shin, 1998) to illustrate the increased likelihood of 
contagion when speculators face uncertainty over the fundamental state of the 
economy. 
The article is organised as follows. The next section outlines the situation 
facing Latin America in 2001-2002 i.e. an initial lack of contagion at the end of 2001 
but increased contagion effects in the second half of 2002. Also presented is a 
summary of the literature that forms the basis of the model in this paper. The 
following section then sets up the framework describing the elements from each of the 
Morris and Shin and Elsinger approaches. Simulations are provided to contrast the 
frequency of contagion between two situations; the first in which each economy is 
viewed perfectly by all market participants; the second where the fundamentals are 
viewed with a degree of uncertainty. The paper then compares the level of the 
fundamentals required to trigger a crisis in each scenario. The final section contains 
concluding remarks incorporating policy implications. 
2. Background 
Summary of Events in Latin America 
November 2001 saw Argentina enduring a debt default, a devaluation of the 
peso and a total of four presidents in ten days. In short, it plummeted into a financial 
crisis from which it is yet to recover. In April 2002, banking and foreign exchange 
activity was suspended and in November 2002 it again defaulted on its $800m debt 
repayment to the World Bank having failed to re-secure IMF aid.   7
This generated concern not just for the state of the Argentinian economy but 
on the impacts on its neighbours. Fear of contagion from an Argentinian collapse 
provoked an IMF aid program for Brazil as early as September 2001 since it had 
much in common with Argentina in terms of a high proportion of external liabilities to 
exports and high public debt. However, Brazil was not subject to crisis until the 
middle of 2002. Opinion polls suggested an upcoming change of leadership which 
triggered adverse market expectations and hence a rise in the EMBI spread. This 
culminated in a sharp devaluation of the real in June 2002 and a deepening financial 
crisis.   
A second country at risk from contagion in the region was Uruguay. While it 
did not immediately succumb to crisis in 2001 following the collapse of the 
Argentinian economy, there is still some empirical evidence of regional contagion. A 
large proportion of the deposit holders in Uruguay were Argentinians (Mussa, 2002) 
and having seen the peso collapse, they were keen to transfer their funds into dollars. 
As a consequence, by June 2002, reserves had fallen by 40% and the currency peg 
was abandoned.  
Venezuela was also in difficulty at this time but not as a consequence of 
contagion. It experienced political and civil unrest throughout 2002 culminating in a 
nationwide strike which was not resolved until February 2003. The impact on the 
economy (particularly with regard to its oil exports) is yet to be fully realised. 
However, it too abandoned its peg following a run on its currency and depletion of 
foreign exchange reserves. 
In short, the mood in mid 2002 in Latin America was summed up by events in 
Mexico. In a speech concerning public finances, the Mexican finance minister likened 
Mexico to Argentina prior to its crisis. This sparked a panic in the market and as a  8
consequence President Vicente Fox had to issue a statement confirming the Mexican 
economy was solid. In short, Argentina’s collapse did not cause an immediate panic 
in the neighbouring financial markets. However, as the crisis deepened, market 
sentiment for the region started to change and by mid 2002 EMBI spreads rose 
throughout Latin America with other countries heading into difficulty.   
Figure 1 provides the Emerging Market Bond Indices of Latin America for the 
years 2001-2003. The base year of January 2001 allows a comparison to be made 
across the countries in the region during Argentina’s crisis period. An increase in this 
index implies that the bond spread is getting larger and hence that speculator-
sentiment in the country is deteriorating. Therefore a rise in the index implies an 
adverse change in sentiment for the bonds of that particular country.  
Clearly, at the time of the Argentinian debt default in 2001, the spreads for 
Venezuela and Brazil suggested no immediate danger from speculative attacks. 
However, by late 2002 indices for all of the Latin American countries were on the 
increase thus demonstrating a distinct fall in speculator sentiment. This supports the 
view that during the 2001 crisis period, speculators distinguished between economies 
in the region (Vogel, 2001). However, by late 2002 there had been a mood shift and 
sentiment for all countries had deteriorated. 
The Literature on Contagion and Common Knowledge 
It is well documented that the IMF intervened to support Brazil and Uruguay 
over widespread concerns of contagion from the collapse of the Argentinian economy. 
However, of equal importance was market reaction to the implementation of these 
IMF programs. Mussa (2002) notes that IMF reforms for Brazil could be highly 
successful if speculator sentiment were favourable but potentially disastrous 
otherwise. As a consequence, this paper brings together models that consider market  9
uncertainty and also contagion to explore the issue of Latin American countries in the 
2001-2002 period.  



















































A concise summary of the literature into currency crises and contagion may be 
found in Pesenti and Tille (2000) which describes the differing schools of thought 
regarding the causes of crises and also the various channels for their spread to other 
countries. Since there is considerable debate surrounding what actually constitutes 
contagion,
1 this paper will use it in its broadest sense to capture any financial, real or 
political links within a region.  
It is a matter of some debate as to which channel of contagion is the most 
relevant for each of the Latin countries in a time of crisis. Glick and Rose (1999) find 
empirical support for contagion through the trade channel for a number of different 
crises worldwide between 1971 and 1997 noting in particular how they tend to be 
regional. However, Allen and Gale (2000) attribute the spread of crises between banks 
to financial linkages. Hernandez and Valdes (2001), meanwhile find that the relevant  10
channel for contagion is region-dependent and also sensitive to how the crisis periods 
are measured. In short, the evidence is inconclusive and hence this calls for a model 
that captures each of the possible linkages; trade, financial or political.  
The model by Elsinger et. al. (2002) is used in this particular framework since 
it is easily adapted to consider contagion in its broadest definition. The original paper 
considers the spread of liquidity crises in an inter-bank market and hence is a model 
that explains bank runs. The roots of this type of approach lie in the story told by 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and more recently in Diamond and Rajan (2002). Banks 
fail for one of two reasons. First, they are fundamentally insolvent. Second, they are 
rendered insolvent by other banks that cannot clear their payments. This can generate 
a cascade of bank failures and, in the extreme, a complete collapse of a country’s 
financial system. In this framework, the model is extended to consider country 
interdependence and hence a crisis in one country can induce crises elsewhere.  
The currency crisis literature has also spawned a number of models which 
consider market uncertainty since speculators are not always perfectly informed. For 
instance, Calvo (1999) shows that a sale of emerging market securities by informed 
agents could be misinterpreted by uninformed agents as suggesting low returns from 
the market and thus cause a financial collapse. Berger and Wagner (2002) also 
consider contagion when there is uncertainty in private sector expectations. A mutual 
dependence of private sector expectations across countries implies that a crisis in one 
country will increase the probability of a crisis in the countries with which it is 
trading. This has implications for the maintenance of a pegged exchange rate regime 
since it is not only actual devaluations which spark crises elsewhere but also the 
likelihood of one.  
                                                                                                                                            
1 A useful summary of the definitions is provided by the World Bank Group (2000).    11
However, while the above models provide a useful insight into speculative 
behaviour during a crisis period, it is argued that models of multiple equilibria are 
more appropriate than single equilibrium models in explaining the process of 
contagion. In an examination of emerging market crises of 1994-5 and 1997, Masson 
(1999) finds that single equilibrium models conditional on macroeconomic 
fundamentals alone do not capture all forms of contagion. He argues that a more 
useful model would incorporate multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling expectations. 
Both of these features are incorporated in the common knowledge literature which 
explicitly models the nature of speculator uncertainty. It demonstrates how the 
collapse of a currency may result from imperfect knowledge over the state of the 
economy’s fundamentals (Morris and Shin, 1998) or the central bank’s willingness to 
defend a currency peg (Allsopp, 2002).  
This framework has formed the basis for a number of other more recent 
investigations. Prati and Sbracia (2002) build on the work of Morris and Shin (1998) 
and also Metz (2002) to provide a model considering uncertainty about fundamentals. 
They find that speculative attacks in six Asian countries depend not only on 
fundamentals but on the market’s expectations of them.  
In the Morris and Shin (1998) framework, multiple equilibria exist if investors 
have complete information. However, when investors each receive private signals 
concerning the state of an economy’s fundamentals with a degree of error, then a 
unique equilibrium emerges. The bottom line is that exchange rate pegs could 
collapse for values of the fundamentals that would otherwise be consistent with the 
peg if only a few or no speculators had attacked the currency. Arguably, this could 
explain the recent events in Latin America since the initial reaction to the Argentinian 
collapse was not a deterioration in speculator sentiment for all the nearby countries.  12
The marked deterioration in Brazilian and Venezuelan bond spreads occurred much 
later with a depletion of their foreign currency reserves and an abandonment of their 
currency pegs. 
The Morris and Shin framework therefore explains the onset of a crisis when 
there is uncertainty over how to interpret the state of the economy or a central bank’s 
willingness to defend a currency. The model of Elsinger et. al. then shows how the 
crisis will unfold. As will be demonstrated later in the paper, a crisis may be restricted 
to one country alone. Equally, there are instances where contagion will develop and 
hence an entire region will be affected. It follows that a combination of these 
frameworks achieves the goal of being able to model each of the two scenarios seen in 
the Latin American countries in 2001 and 2002. 
3. Model 
Modelling Contagion 
A model to describe the Latin American experience needs to be sufficiently 
versatile to allow for the many different types of inter-linkages between countries. For 
instance, there are not only trade and financial linkages in the region but also political 
ties to consider
2. The different channels for spill-over can be incorporated in matrix 
form showing the extent of the commitments between each country. For simplicity 
these will be considered in financial terms.  
There are N countries in the region. Each country,  N i∈  has a particular level 
of foreign exchange reserves reflecting its fundamental state and its ability to defend a 
pegged exchange rate. This is denoted by  i θ . It also has liabilities to other countries 
                                                 
2 These are not only evident between the Latin countries but also with economies outside the region 
e.g. between Mexico and US. 
   13
denoted by  ij l . When the fundamentals of countries are strong, central banks are more 
able to meet their debt obligations and hence  i θ  takes on a large value. Conversely, 
when fundamentals are poor, central banks are less equipped to manage their foreign 
debt. 
The inter-linkages between countries in the region can therefore be described 
by an  N N ×  matrix, L whereas the fundamental state of each economy is reflected in 
the vector, 
N R ∈ θ . This system is denoted by (L , θ ) which shows that a country’s 
financial viability is dependent on (a) its net indebtedness with other countries and (b) 
its fundamental state reflected in its stock of foreign exchange reserves. 
Each entry in the matrix, L, represents $US billions. Rows indicate debt owed 





















L       ( 1 )  
For example Country 1 owes $ 12 l  billion to Country 2 and $ 13 l  billion to Country 3. 
The zeros throughout the diagonals imply that the countries have no foreign debt with 
themselves. Conversely, Country 1 is owed $ 21 l  billion dollars from Country 2 and 
$ 23 l  billion from Country 3. It follows that total inter-country debt can be given by the 
vector  () () () () 32 31 23 21 13 12 , , l l l l l l d + + + = . The vector,  () 3 2 1 , , θ θ θ θ =  shows the level 
of foreign reserves held by each central bank and represents the fundamentals of the 
economy.    
As in Elsinger et. al. a mechanism must be defined to settle payments in the 
event that countries cannot honour their debts. In their paper, default is resolved by 
the proportional sharing of the value of the debtor bank among its creditors. Clearly,  14
when we consider countries as a whole, this is not the typical outcome
3. In the 
absence of a sovereign debt restructuring program, the nature of foreign law debt 
implies that it is a legal nightmare to resolve a country’s debt defaults hence it is more 
often the case that none of the creditors receive their payments at least initially
4. For 
these reasons, I report the results from each of the two approaches. Irrespective of the 
procedure adopted, the implication is that the resolution of insolvency determines 
actual payments between countries. 
Using the proportional sharing of country value approach we get the following 
matrix  []




















32 31 32 32 31 31
23 21 23 23 21 21
13 12 13 13 12 12
l l l l l l
l l l l l l
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π         ( 3 )  
From this it is possible to describe a clearing payment vector which gives the total 
payments made by each country under the clearing mechanism. A clearing payment 



















i j ji i i p d p
1
* * 0 , max , min θ π . This implies 
that a country either honours its debts and hence  i i d p =
*  or it defaults on its debts 










i j ji i p p
1
* * 0 , max θ π . Using an iterative process it is apparent that if 
all countries meet their debts there is no default and hence no contagion. However, if 
one country cannot meet its obligations, the clearing mechanism then calculates the 
                                                 
3 More likely is the imposition of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism through which the 
defaulting country reaches an agreement with its creditors to meet its obligations. In return the existing 
rights of creditors to sue in court are suppressed at least for a given period.    15
proportional payments made to the creditor countries. This in turn has an impact on 
the fundamentals of those countries. In a second iteration of this process, the creditor 
countries only receive a proportion of the debts due to them. This means that, in turn, 
they may not be able to meet their own debts. If that is the case then they are rendered 
insolvent and their own debts are subject to proportional sharing among their 
creditors. This procedure is derived from Eisenberg and Noe (2001) who refer to it as 
the “fictitious default algorithm”. They show that after N iterations at the most, it 
converges to the unique payment vector 
* p .  
In the extreme, countries which can readily meet their debt obligations for a 
given set of fundamentals still suffer a debt default when partner countries default on 
debts. In short, a country subject to default will render subsequent countries insolvent 
through contagion. Not only is it possible to identify those countries which will 
succumb to financial insolvency but also we can distinguish those countries which are 
prone to contagion. The usefulness of this is that it can act as an “early warning 
system” indicating countries which are financially vulnerable.  
As in Elsinger et. al. this is illustrated using an example. L is a 4 x 4 matrix 
representing three regional economies, A, B and C with linkages to the rest of the 














0 0 0 0
0 0 100 100
0 50 0 150
250 0 0 0
L       ( 4 )  
 There are two scenarios. The first one shows contagion when defaults are resolved 
through proportional sharing. By contrast, in Scenario 2 the defaulting country pays 
none of its creditors. For each scenario, the L matrix remains the same but three 
                                                                                                                                            
4 It has been noted that Argentina’s debt is likely to take many years to resolve.  16
different vectors of fundamentals are considered. In the first case, fundamentals are 
such that all countries meet their debt obligations and hence no default arises. In the 
second case, one country is subject to default but contagion does not occur since the 
remaining countries have sufficiently strong fundamentals to offset the loss. In the 
final case, contagion prevails since the remaining countries do not have strong enough 
fundamentals to meet their debts if one of the other countries defaults. The outcome is 
seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: A Table to Show the Frequency of Debt Default and Contagion for 
Different States of the Economy 
Case Scenario  1 
(Proportional Sharing) 
Scenario 2 
(No Payments to Creditors) 
No Defaults  () 1000 , 150 , 100 , 100 = θ  
() 0 , 200 , 200 , 250
* = p  
No Countries Default 
() 1000 , 150 , 100 , 100 = θ  
() 0 , 200 , 200 , 250
* = p  
No Countries Default 
1 Default – No 
Contagion 
() 1000 , 100 , 200 , 100 = θ  
() 0 , 150 , 200 , 250
* = p  
Country C Defaults 
() 1000 , 100 , 200 , 100 = θ  
() 0 , 0 , 200 , 250
* = p  
Country C Defaults 
1 Default – 
Contagion 
() 1000 , 100 , 100 , 100 = θ  
() 0 , 86 . 142 , 43 . 171 , 250
* = p  
Country C Defaults 
Country B Defaults Through 
Contagion 
() 1000 , 100 , 100 , 100 = θ  
() 0 , 0 , 0 , 0
* = p  
Country C Defaults 
Countries B and A Default 
Through Contagion 
  17
Notably, the model shows the circumstances under which defaults are 
restricted to one country and equally when they are subject to contagion. The 
distinction between scenarios 1 and 2 becomes all apparent when looking at the 
degree of contagion generated by a defaulting country. When default is resolved 
through proportional sharing only Countries B and C default. However, when none of 
the creditors of defaulting countries get paid, Country A is also rendered insolvent. 
This has policy implications for international organisations such as the IMF or World 
Bank since an appropriate payments system could limit the damage of a debt crisis in 
a region and imply that a country could be spared the costs of default.  
Clearly the preferable situation would be one of ‘no default’. However, this 
could only be guaranteed if the countries in question were subject to constant scrutiny 
and restrictions issued by international organisations to prevent insolvency in the first 
place. However, this is not in the spirit of the IMF or World Bank. Given that defaults 
are inevitable, it therefore seems that the best response for the countries themselves is 
to ensure that they are not vulnerable to contagion. This suggests a need not only for 
strong fundamentals to offset losses from defaulting partner countries but also 
diversification of foreign investment.  
Modelling the Onset of a Crisis 
Morris and Shin illustrate the importance of common knowledge in a model of 
currency crisis by comparing two situations. In the first instance, investors view 
perfectly the fundamentals of the economy. In the second instance, they observe the 
fundamentals with a degree of error. It is shown that when common knowledge holds, 
the model is characterised by multiple equilibria. Conversely, when there is a lack of 
common knowledge regarding the state of the economy, a unique equilibrium 
prevails. When the state of the economy exceeds a particular level, an attack will not  18
occur. However, below this threshold, it becomes optimal for speculators to abandon 
the currency and as a consequence, the currency collapses.  
Agents 
The framework is as follows. The agents in the model consist of one central 
bank and Q speculators each with equal-sized holdings of the domestic currency. 
Each agent aims to maximise a payoff, the details of which will follow. The 
economy’s exchange rate is assumed to be pegged at 
* e and its fundamentals,θ , are 
uniformly distributed over the interval, [] 1 , 0 . In the absence of intervention, the 
exchange rate is a function of the fundamentals,  () θ f  and lies at or below the pegged 
rate.  
Payoffs 
The central bank derives a value, 0 > v , from defending a pegged regime but 
also faces a cost,  () θ α , c , which varies with the size of the fundamentals, θ  and the 
proportion of speculators abandoning the currency, α . Defending the exchange rate 
peg yields a payoff of  () θ α , c v −  for the central bank while abandoning it gives a zero 
payoff. Each speculator observes a signal, x, drawn uniformly from the interval 
[] ε θ ε θ + − ,  where ε  represents a degree of error. When there is no uncertainty 
regarding the state of the fundamentals, ε  takes on a value of zero. If the speculator 
attacks the currency, he/she incurs a transaction cost given by  0 > t  which implies a 
payoff of  t −  if the attack is subsequently defended. However, if the attack is 
successful and the peg is abandoned he/she earns  () t f e − − θ
* .   
Model Sequence 
(1) At the outset, the fundamentals are determined by nature and are uniformly 
distributed over the interval, [] 1 , 0.   19
(2) Each speculator receives a signal,  x, concerning the state of the fundamentals. 
This is drawn uniformly from the interval, [] ε θ ε θ + − ,  and is identically and 
independently distributed across individuals conditional on θ . If common knowledge 
prevails, they observe the fundamentals perfectly but when they face uncertainty, the 
signal contains a degree of error. He/She then decides whether to attack the currency 
or not.  
(3) The central bank observes the proportion of speculators abandoning the currency, 
α  and decides whether to defend the peg. In equilibrium, the strategy for the 
government and speculators is such that no agent has an incentive to deviate.  
Tripartite Distinction of Fundamentals 
Morris and Shin denote θ  as the value of the fundamentals which solves 
() v c = θ , 0 . This represents the value of θ  at which the central bank is indifferent 
between defending or abandoning the peg. Conversely, they denote θ  as the value of 
θ  solving  () t e f − =
* θ . Using these two thresholds it is possible to describe a 
tripartite distinction for the fundamentals when common knowledge prevails. For 
values in the interval, [] θ , 0  the currency is unstable since the peg will collapse 
irrespective of the actions of speculators. Conversely, when the fundamentals fall in 
the interval, [ ] 1 , θ , the currency is deemed stable. Even if all speculators attack the 
currency, the end result is a depreciation that is so small as to make the payoff from 
abandoning the currency not worth the cost. The region, [ ] θ θ ,  is termed “ripe for 
attack” since the central bank’s decision to abandon the peg will depend on the 
proportion of speculators leaving the currency.  
Common Knowledge Versus Uncertainty  20
To understand the impact of common knowledge within the model, consider 
first the strategy of the central bank (known to all speculators) and hence the payoffs 
to speculators across all possible levels of the fundamentals. 
The critical proportion of speculators needed to cause a currency to collapse is 
() θ a . In the unstable region this takes on a value of zero while elsewhere it is that 
value of α  which solves  ()v c = θ α , . It follows that the central bank will abandon the 
peg if α  is greater than the critical mass,  () θ a . Given the strategy of the central bank, 
it is possible to ascertain the payoffs between the speculators. In the model,  () x π  
denotes the proportion of speculators to attack the currency when signalx is received. 
It follows that we can denote the proportion of speculators who attack the currency 
when the fundamentals are θ  given the selling strategy, π , as  () π θ , s . With signals 









π θ dx x s
2
1
,         ( 5 )  
Now let () π A  denote the event that the central bank abandons the peg when the 
speculators follow the strategy π . This is given by: 
() ( ) () {} θ π θ θ π a s A ≥ = ,        ( 6 )  
Payoffs to speculators from attacking the currency when the fundamentals are θ  and 
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     (7) 
However, note that when speculators view the fundamentals with a degree of error, it 
is the expected payoff which is paramount in deciding whether to abandon the 
currency. The expected payoff conditional on signal x is the expectation of (7) and is 
described by:  21
() () () ()
() []
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,      (8) 
The speculator’s decision will therefore depend on whether  () π , x u  is positive or 
negative. For positive values,  () 1 = x π  and all speculators sell their holdings of the 
currency. For negative values,  () 0 = x π  and no speculators attack the currency.  
Therefore the presence of a small amount of noise implies that the multiplicity 
of equilibria mentioned earlier disappears and there is a unique equilibrium. The main 
result of the Morris and Shin paper is to show that under imperfect information, a 
unique value of the fundamentals exists below which it is optimal for the central bank 
to abandon its currency peg. The reader is referred to Morris and Shin (1998) for a 
proof of this result. 
Modelling the Crisis and the Resulting Contagion under Perfect 
and Imperfect Knowledge 
Incorporating the Morris and Shin model into the Elsinger framework of 
contagion has significant implications for the frequency of initial speculative attacks 
and hence also on the likelihood of a regional crisis. 
Agents 
There are three types of agent in this model. As in the Morris and Shin 
framework there is a central bank which seeks to maximise its payoff. It attaches a 
value,  0 > v , to maintaining a pegged exchange rate but incurs costs,  () θ α , c , from 
doing so. A speculative attack makes debt default more likely since it depletes 
reserves, reduces fundamentals and makes an economy less able to meet its 
commitments hence there is a positive value of maintaining the peg. The variable v is  22
therefore the value of avoiding the risk of possible debt default. For simplicity it is 
assumed constant across all economies in the region.  
If the central bank defends the exchange rate peg its payoff is  () θ α , c v −  
whereas abandoning the peg yields a zero payoff.  The cost of defending a currency 
depends on the proportion of speculators abandoning the currency and the size of the 
fundamentals. This does not incorporate any additional costs associated with debt 
default. 
There areQspeculators each of equal size in terms of their holdings of 
domestic currency. As before, each speculator observes a signal,x, drawn uniformly 
from the interval [] ε θ ε θ + − ,  where ε  represents a degree of error and takes on a 
value of zero when fundamentals are viewed perfectly
5. Abandoning the currency 
incurs a transaction cost of  0 > t  and if the attack is subsequently defended, the 
speculator’s payoff is  t − . However, if the attack is successful and the peg is 
abandoned he/she earns  () t f e − − θ
* . Speculators do not observe the liabilities of 
their country or its claims on other economies. As such, they are ignorant of the 
entries in theL matrix and base their decision purely on the fundamentals of their 
own economy seen in the vector,  i θ . 
The final group of agents are those foreign investors who have claims on the 
country’s central bank. They have no strategic interaction within the model. Their 
purpose is purely to show a very basic inter-linkage between economies. 
Fundamentals in the Model 
In the Elsinger framework, a crisis is initially generated by fundamentals 
which are inconsistent with a country’s foreign obligations. When fundamentals are 
                                                 
5   It is assumed that  { } θ θ ε − < 100 , min 2.   23
weak and claims cannot be met, a country will default. Their approach can thus model 
a debt default, but says nothing about the central bank’s decision to abandon a pegged 
exchange rate regime. This is the role of the Morris and Shin component of the model 
in which the  i θ  vector represents the fundamentals of each different country. The θ  
of each country is uniformly distributed over the interval, [] 200 , 0.   
Sequence of Events 
The speculators base their decision of whether to abandon the currency on 
their observations of the fundamentals. These are viewed either with or without a 
degree of error depending on whether common knowledge prevails in the model. The 
central bank’s decision regarding the defence of the peg depends on the percentage of 
speculators abandoning the currency, α . Notably, there is now an additional factor to 
consider; namely the link between the fundamentals and the liabilities to other 
economies. It is assumed that a speculative attack on the currency depletes the level of 
reserves and hence reduces the size of the fundamentals. In particular, the 
fundamentals will deplete by α . Clearly, this will influence the ability to manage 
foreign debt requirements, hence a debt default becomes more likely.
6  
The tripartite distinction for the fundamentals still exists when there is perfect 
information regarding the state of the fundamentals. When  θ θ < , then even if none 
of the speculators attack the currency, the central bank will still abandon the peg. 
However, as noted earlier, the rational strategy for the speculator is to attack when 
fundamentals fall below this level. Equally, when  θ θ >  and the fundamentals are 
sound, none of the speculators will attack the currency, since the fundamentals are 
strong enough to withstand a crisis even if all speculators chose to attack.  
                                                 
6   If debt defaults were allowed to precede speculative attacks in this model, the fundamentals 
would fall to zero making an attack on the currency and the subsequent abandonment of the 
peg inevitable.   24
Once more the interesting case is where the fundamentals fall between θ  and 
θ . With common knowledge, the outcome depends on the proportion of speculators 
who attack the currency. Thus for perfect information, multiple equilibria exist. 
However, a unique equilibrium prevails when speculators view the fundamentals with 
a degree of error and hence there is always an incentive to attack the currency when 
fundamentals fall in this ‘ripe for attack’ region.  
Unlike the Morris and Shin framework, the story does not end there. There are 
countries’ liabilities with foreign investors to consider. Even when there is no 
speculative attack on a currency, there may still be a debt default. The only difference 
is that a debt default is more likely once a speculative attack has occurred since 
reserves will already be much reduced. We may therefore see one of four events 
occurring; a speculative attack and a debt default, a speculative attack and no debt 
default, no speculative attack and no default, no speculative and a debt default. 
What is a Currency Crisis in this Framework? 
This brings into question the definition of a currency crisis. In this paper, it is 
defined as a speculative attack on the currency which causes a central bank to 
abandon its exchange rate peg. As a consequence the country may or may not fall 
prey to debt default either as a consequence of reduced fundamentals or through 
contagion. This is termed a debt crisis. The speculative attack on the currency shows 
that a country which would otherwise have met its foreign obligations will be driven 
into default. The impact on the likelihood of debt crises and contagion may be seen by 
simulation. To form a comparison, the entries in the matrix L and vector  i θ  will 
remain as before. 
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Simulation Using Figures From Elsinger Model 
In order to provide a numerical simulation, functional forms need to be 
assigned to  () θ α , c  and  () θ f . In the case of the cost function it is assumed that:  
β θ α + − = c . Thus the cost of defending a peg increases with the percentage of 
speculators attacking the currency and decreases with stronger fundamentals. The 
constant, β , ensures that in the worst state of fundamentals, the cost of defending the 
currency exceeds the value derived from it even when none of the speculators attack. 
It also implies that in the best state of fundamentals, the cost of defending the 
currency outstrips the value if all speculators attack the currency. This is not crucial to 
the model. When  0 = β , this merely implies fewer instances in which speculative 
attacks are launched. 
The exchange rate in the absence of central bank intervention,  () θ f  is 
assumed to be less than the pegged rate, 
* e  but increasing in θ  so that a higher 
floating rate is associated with stronger fundamentals. Again it takes on a simple 
form:  () θ θ + = y f  where the  y  parameter is included to show that even when 
fundamentals are at their lowest, the floating rate is non-zero. 
The variables take on the following numerical values
7: 
40 = v ,  150 = β ,  [] 100 , 0 = α ,  10 = ε ,  [] 200 , 0 = θ , 
10 = y ,  20 = t . 
Central Bank Strategy 
The central bank will abandon the peg if  ()v c > θ α , . Recall that θ   is the 
value of the fundamentals, θ , which solves  () v c = θ , 0  i.e. it is that value at which the 
central bank is just indifferent between defending the currency and maintaining it  26
when none of the speculators attack the currency. In terms of the figures shown above 
this is where  110 = θ . Clearly the vectors of fundamentals given in Table 1 show a 
number of economies falling below this limit and hence these would be subject to 
speculative attacks. Conversely, θ  is the value of the fundamentals which 
solves () t e f − =
* θ . Beyond the level,  190 = θ , the central bank’s costs of defending 
an attack on the currency will always fall short of the value even if all speculators 
were to abandon the currency.   
Speculators’ Strategy 
The speculators form their decisions based on the central bank strategy 
outlined above. If they view the fundamentals with perfect information, the payoff to 
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It follows that, when common knowledge prevails, any value of the fundamentals 
below 110 implies that it is optimal to attack while any value exceeding 190 implies 
that it is always preferable not to attack. In the ripe for attack region, the decision to 
abandon the currency rests on the proportion of speculators who attack and hence 
nothing more can be said of this case.  
When there is imperfect information among speculators the payoff must be 
found from the posterior distribution across all states conditional on the signal 
received. The expected payoff is give by:  
() () () ()
() []













− = = ∫ ∫
+ − ∩
+
















                                                                                                                                            
7   The qualitative results of the model are robust for other values of these variables. The only 
proviso is that the relationships already described in the paper are met.  27
Any value of θ  exceeding 190 produces a negative expected payoff,  () π , x u , hence it 
is optimal for each speculator to refrain from attacking when the fundamentals fall in 
this region. However, when the fundamentals fall below 190 the expected payoff is 
positive, even in the ripe for attack region and thus it is rational to attack. 
The model implies that it only takes a small degree of uncertainty in 
speculators’ perceptions for a crisis to be triggered for values of the fundamentals 
which would otherwise be sound. The full impact of these speculative attacks, both 
with and without common knowledge of the fundamentals, can be seen in the model 
of contagion. The same vectors of fundamentals are used as in Table 1. The difference 
is that each value is compared with the critical values of θ  and θ  under perfect and 
imperfect information. If it falls in the crisis region, then the value of the 
fundamentals is reduced by the percentage of speculators attacking the currency. The 
country then needs to meet its debt obligations. At this point, debt default may arise. 
Common Knowledge 
When speculators observe fundamentals with no degree of error, it is optimal 
to attack the currency if the fundamentals fall below 110. Referring back to Table 1, 
Country A is always subject to attack, Country D (representing the rest of the world) 
is never attacked, Country B is attacked in Cases 1 and 3 when its fundamentals are 
just 100 and Country C is attacked in Cases 2 and 3 when its fundamentals are 100. 
However in Case 1, its fundamentals fall in the ‘ripe for attack’ region hence whether 
it is initially attacked or not depends on the proportion of speculators to attack the 
currency. However, this becomes immaterial when contagion is examined since 
Country C falls prey to debt default as a consequence of contagion. Indeed, compared 
with Table 1 it is apparent that allowing for speculative behaviour in the foreign  28
exchange markets implies a higher incidence of debt default than when speculative 
behaviour is not incorporated.  
 
Table 2: A Table to Show the Frequency of Debt Default and Contagion for 
Different States of the Economy when Speculators have Perfect Knowledge of 
Fundamentals 
Case Scenario  1 
(Proportional Sharing) 
Scenario 2 
(No Payments to Creditors) 
1 Default – 2 
Cases of 
Contagion  
() 1000 , 150 , 0 , 0 = θ  
() 0 , 43 . 171 , 71 . 85 , 150
* = p  
Country B Defaults 
Countries A and C Default 
Through Contagion 
() 1000 , 150 , 0 , 0 = θ  
() 0 , 0 , 0 , 0
* = p  
Country B Defaults 
Countries A and C Default 
Through Contagion  
1 Default – 1 Case 
of Contagion 
() 1000 , 0 , 200 , 0 = θ  
() 0 , 50 , 200 , 175
* = p  
Country C Defaults 
Country A Defaults Through 
Contagion  
() 1000 , 0 , 200 , 0 = θ  
() 0 , 0 , 200 , 0
* = p  
Country C Defaults 
Country A Defaults 
Through Contagion 
3 Defaults – No 
Cases of  
Contagion 
() 1000 , 0 , 0 , 0 = θ  
() 0 , 0 , 0 , 0
* = p  
Countries A, B and C Default 
() 1000 , 0 , 0 , 0 = θ  
() 0 , 0 , 0 , 0
* = p  
Countries A, B and C 
Default  
 
Imperfect Knowledge  29
Under imperfect information, the same scenario prevails as shown in Table 2 
with one main exception. In Case 1, it becomes optimal for speculators in Country C 
to attack their currency since fundamentals fall in the ‘ripe for attack’ region. It 
follows that reserves are depleted and hence the fundamentals fall from 150 to 50. 
The vector of fundamentals is given by  () 1000 , 50 , 0 , 0 = θ  and the clearing payment in 
each scenario becomes  () 0 , 0 , 0 , 0
* = p . In this particular instance, all countries default 
immediately with none subject to contagion.  
It has been shown that incorporating speculative behaviour into the basic 
contagion framework increases the frequency of debt defaults among economies. This 
also makes contagion more likely since countries’ fundamentals are weakened 
through speculative attacks. When we then distinguish between the nature of 
information received by speculators, it is shown that imperfectly viewed fundamentals 
cause an even greater incidence of initial defaults of countries since speculative 
attacks becomes more frequent. Therefore, the overall impact of combining strategic 
speculative behaviour with a model of country indebtedness is to cause considerably 
more instances of debt default than if the basic foreign debt inter-linkages were 
viewed in isolation.    
4. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The aim of this paper was to produce a model to explain the events of 2001-2 
in Latin America. At the time, these countries were characterised by large foreign 
debt obligations and inter-linkages with both neighbouring countries and the rest of 
the world. The initial collapse of the Argentinian economy was not immediately 
followed by contagion in the region. However, as the crisis deepened in 2002, more 
countries were subject to speculative attacks.   30
A model of contagion alone is shown to be useful in examining the spread of 
debt default across countries in the region (for instance between Argentina and 
Uruguay). However, it fails to explain a crucial aspect of the crises; namely strategic 
speculative behaviour. Hence the framework adopted in this paper incorporates the 
role of speculators.   
Using the model one may argue that during 2001, many of the Latin countries 
had strong enough fundamentals to deter an attack and withstand the collapse of a 
close financial or trading partner. However, during the following year, fundamentals 
deteriorated and hence economies were vulnerable to attack from speculators and an 
inability to meet debt obligations. 
What are the implications for policy? In terms of the contagion model alone, 
one would suggest that countries diversify their trade and financial links rather than 
rely on one close partner. It is apparent that a debt default by the partner economy 
increases the likelihood of default for the home economy. Furthermore, a 
strengthening of the fundamentals would also be recommended as a long term 
prescription. However, when the strategic behaviour of speculators is included, it is 
not just the soundness of the fundamentals which counts but the speculators’ 
perceptions of them. As noted earlier, the lack of contagion during 2001 was 
attributed to positive speculator sentiment (Vogel, 2001), hence its role in a model of 
currency crisis should not be underestimated.  
In the unlikely event that the state of the economy is viewed perfectly, a ‘ripe 
for attack’ region implies that if enough speculators attack a currency, the peg will be 
abandoned. However, if speculator sentiment is high, an economy can maintain its 
currency peg yet still have fundamentals of this magnitude. If the economy is viewed 
with uncertainty as is more often the case, there is an even greater incentive to ensure  31
that fundamentals are sound and do not fall in this region. If they do, a speculative 
attack is optimal and as a consequence, debt default can follow. The policy advice is 
then apparent; the state of the economy is crucial not just to avoid the obvious default 
on foreign obligations but also to deter the possibility of speculative attacks on a 
currency. The Latin American central banks will be well aware of these issues. The 
task now is to re-build sound fundamentals and a solid reputation from crisis-ridden 
economies. 
References 
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (2000). Financial Contagion. Journal of Political Economy 108 
(1), 1-33. 
Allsopp, L. (2002). Common Knowledge and the Value of Defending a Fixed 
Exchange Rate – An Explanation of a Currency Crisis. Journal of 
Macroeconomics 24(1), 67-79. 
Berger, W., & Wagner, H. (2002). Spreading Currency Crises: The Role of Economic 
Interdependence. IMF Working Paper 144. 
Calvo, G. (1999). Contagion in Emerging Markets: When Wall Street is a Carrier. 
University of Maryland, mimeo. 
Calvo, G., & Mendoza, E. (2000). Rational Contagion and the Globalization of 
Securities Markets. Journal of International Economics 51(1), 79-113.  
Diamond, D. D., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983). Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and 
Liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91, 401- 419.  
Diamond, D. D., & Rajan, R. G. (2002). Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises. 
NBER Working Paper 8937. 
Eisenberg, L., & Noe, T. H. (2001). Systemic Risk in Financial Systems. Management 
Science 47, 236-49.  32
Elsinger, H., Lehar, A., & Summer, M. (2002). Risk Assessment for Banking 
Systems. Oesterreichische Nationalbank Working Paper 79. 
Fiess, N. (2003). Capital Flows, Country Risk and Contagion. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 2943. 
Glick, R., & Rose, A. (1999). Contagion and Trade: Why Are Currency Crises 
Regional? Journal of International Money and Finance 18(4), 603-617. 
Hernandez, L. F., & Valdes, R. O. (2001). What Drives Contagion: Trade, 
Neighborhood, or Financial Links? IMF Working Paper 29. 
Masson, P. (1999). Contagion: Macroeconomic Models with Multiple Equilibria. 
Journal of International Money and Finance 18(4), 587-602. 
Metz, C. E. (2002). Private and Public Information in Self-Fulfilling Currency Crises. 
Journal of Economics 76(1), 65-85. 
Morris, S., & Shin, H. S. (1998). Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling 
Crises. American Economic Review 88, 587-97. 
Mussa, M. (2002). Latin American Economic Crisis. Testimony Before 
Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 
Pesenti, P., & Tille, C. (2000). The Economics of Currency Crises and Contagion: An 
Introduction. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review. 
Prati, A., & Sbracia, M. (2002). Currency Crises and Uncertainty about 
Fundamentals. IMF Working Paper 3. 
World Bank Group (2000). Definitions and Causes of Contagion. 
http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/managing%20volatility/contagion/definit
ions.html  33
CIES DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
The CIES Discussion Paper series provides a means of circulating promptly papers 
of interest to the research and policy communities and written by staff and visitors 
associated with the Centre for International Economic Studies (CIES) at the Adelaide 
University. Its purpose is to stimulate discussion of issues of contemporary policy 
relevance among non-economists as well as economists. To that end the papers are 
non-technical in nature and more widely accessible than papers published in 
specialist academic journals and books. (Prior to April 1999 this was called the CIES 
Policy Discussion Paper series. Since then the former CIES Seminar Paper series 
has been merged with this series.) 
 
Copies of CIES Policy Discussion Papers may be downloaded from our Web 
site at http://www.adelaide.edu.au/cies/ or are available by contacting the 
Executive Assistant, CIES, School of Economics, Adelaide University, SA 5005 
AUSTRALIA. Tel: (+61 8) 8303 5672, Fax: (+61 8) 8223 1460, Email: 
cies@adelaide.edu.au. Single copies are free on request; the cost to institutions is 
US$5.00 overseas or A$5.50 (incl. GST) in Australia each including postage and 
handling. 
 
For a full list of CIES publications, visit our Web site at 
http://www.adelaide.edu.au/cies/ or write, email or fax to the above address for our 
List of Publications by CIES Researchers, 1989 to 1999 plus updates. 
 
0308  Allsopp, Louise, “Speculative Behaviour, Debt Default and Contagion: An 
Explanation of the Latin American Crisis 2001-2002”, March 2003. 
0307  Barreto, Raul. A., “A Model of State Infrastructure with Decentralized Public Agents: 
Theory and Evidence”, March 2003. 
0306  Pardey, Philip G., Julian M. Alston, Connie Chan-Kang, Eduardo C. Magalhães, and 
Stephen A. Vosti, “Assessing and Attributing the Benefits from Varietal Improvement 
Research: Evidence from Embrapa, Brazil”, March 2003. 
0305  Allsopp, Louise, “Venezuela: A Nation In Need of Reform”, March 2003. 
0304  Allsopp, Louise and Ralf Zurbruegg, “Purchasing Power Parity in East Asia: Why all 
the Fuss?”, March 2003. 
0303  Allsopp, Louise and Ralf Zurbruegg, “Purchasing Power Parity and the Impact of the 
East Asian Currency Crisis”, March 2003. 
0302  Siregar, Reza and Ramkishen Rajan, “Exchange Rate Policy and Foreign Exchange 
Reserves Management in Indonesia in the Context of East Asian Monetary 
Regionalism”, March 2003. 
0301  Jackson, Lee Ann, “Protectionist Harmonization of Food Safety Policies in the Asia-
Pacific Region”, January 2003. 
0236  Damania, Richard, “Protectionist Lobbying and Strategic Investment”, November 
2002 
0235  Damania, Richard and John Hatch, “Protecting Eden: Markets or Government?”, 
November 2002. 
0234  Anderson, Kym, “Agricultural Trade Reform and Poverty Reduction in Developing 
Countries”, November 2002. 
0233  Wood, Danielle and Kym Anderson, “What Determines the Future Value of an Icon 
Wine? Evidence from Australia”, November 2002. 
0232  Kym Anderson and Nielsen, Chantal, “Economic Effects of Agricultural 
Biotechnology Research in the Presence of Price-distorting Policies”. November 
2002.  34
0231  Jackson, Lee Ann, “Who Benefits from Quality Labelling? Segregation Costs, 
International Trade and Producer Outcomes”. November 2002. 
0230  Rajan, Ramkishen, “Trade Liberalization and Poverty: Where Do We Stand?”, 
November 2002. 
0229  Rajaguru, Gulasekaran and Reza Siregar, “Sources of Variations Between the 
Inflation Rates of Korea, Thailand and Indonesia During the Post-1997 Crisis”, 
November 2002. 
0228  Barbier, Edward B, “Water and Economic Growth”, October 2002. 
0227  Barbier, Edward B, “The Role of Natural Resources in Economic Development”, 
October 2002. (The 49
th Joseph Fisher Lecture.) 
0226  Rajan, Ramkishen and Rahul Sen, “Liberalisation of Financial Services in Southeast 
Asia under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS)”, October 2002. 
(Forthcoming in Journal of International Banking Law).  
0225  Anderson, Kym “Building an Internationally Competitive Australian Olive Industry: 
Lessons from the Wine Industry,” October 2002. 
0224  Bentzen, Jan, Søren Leth-Sørensen and Valdemar Smith, “Prices of French Icon 
Wines and the Business Cycle: Empirical Evidence from Danish Wine Auctions,” 
September 2002. 
0223  Bentzen, Jan and Valdemar Smith, “Wine Prices in the Nordic Countries: Are They 
Lower Than in the Region of Origin?” September 2002. 
0222  Rajan, Ramkishen and Graham Bird, ““Will Asian Economies Gain from Liberalizing 
Trade in Services?” September 2002. (Forthcoming in Journal of World Trade). 
0221  Siregar, Reza Y. and Gulasekaran Rajaguru, “Base Money and Exchange Rate: 
Sources of Inflation in Indonesia during the Post-1997 Financial Crisis” August 2002. 
0220 Rajan,  Ramkishen,  “International Financial Liberalisation in Developing Countries: 
Lessons from Recent Experiences” July 2002. (Published in Economic and Political 
Weekly, 37 (29): 3017-21, July 20-26, 2002). 
0219  Rajan, Ramkishen, Reza Siregar and Graham Bird, “Capital Flows and Regional 
Financial Interdependencies in the Context of Crises: Evidence From East Asia” 
August 2002. 
0218  Bird, Graham and Ramkishen Rajan, “The Political Economy of A Trade-First 
Approach to Regionalism”, July 2002. 
0217  Ramkishen, Rajan and Rahul Sen, “Liberalisation of International Trade in Financial 
Services in Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand”, July 
2002. (Since published in Journal of International Financial Markets 4(5): 170-80, 
2002). 
0216  Anderson, Kym, “International Trade and Industry Policies”, July 2002. (Forthcoming 
in The Cambridge Handbook of Social Sciences in Australia, edited by I. McAllister, 
S. Dowrick and R. Hassan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
0215  Anderson, Kym, “The New Global Economy: Opportunities and Challenges for Small 
Open Economies”, July, 2002. (Forthcoming as Ch. 3 in Sustaining Singapore’s 
Competitiveness in the New Global Economy, edited by R. Rajan, London: Edward 
Elgar, 2003). 
0214  Pincus, Jonathan, “Environmental Economics and the Murray-Darling”, July 2002. 
0213  Brennan, Geoffrey and Jonathan Pincus, "From the Australian Settlement to 
Microeconomic Reform: the Change in Twentieth Century Policy Regimes", July 
2002. 
 